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In this chapter, we address the following question: Does board gender diversity 
affect global risk? Drawing on agency theory, upper echelon theory, and human 
capital theory, we hypothesize that gender diversity on the board of directors will 
decrease the volatility of firm risk. Applying fixed effect estimation on a panel 
data of listed French companies (SBF120) for the years 2011–2018, the results show 
a negative link between the percentage of female directors on the board and the 
standard deviation of monthly stock return as firm risk proxy suggesting that the 
inclusion of more women on corporate boards could improve financial stability. Our 
findings contribute to the literature by providing empirical evidence from France 
occupying the first place at the European level with the most female presence on the 
boards of directors.1
Keywords: board gender diversity, board of directors, corporate governance,  
firm risk, SBF 120
1. Introduction
Recent years have been marked by an abundance of research, both theoretical 
and empirical, dealing with the impact of board gender diversity on firm perfor-
mance. Results have often remained mixed and the mechanisms by which gender 
diversity could impact global performance remain ambiguous and not fully under-
stood. Furthermore, little attention has been devoted to gender diversity on the 
board of directors as an instrument moderating firm risk.
The board of directors plays a crucial role in strategies adoption and the 
firm’s future direction design. In addition, it is an essential corporate governance 
mechanism. In literature, it is well accepted that the board of directors is a scarce, 
valuable, and inimitable resource favoring the creation of sustainable competitive 
advantage. However, its effectiveness remains largely dependent on its size and 
member’s composition. For instance, its decisions would be influenced by its size, 
member’s background, level of education, ages, as well as by its “degree of femi-
nization.” Indeed, gender diversity is seen as one of the mechanisms of corporate 
governance and a key element in policymaking.
1 BoardEx Global Gender Balance Report 2021. https://www.boardex.
com/2020-global-gender-diversity-analysis-women-on-boards/
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The majority of European countries, (among them France, Italy, and Norway),2 
have adopted during the last decade legislation imposing greater representation of 
the female gender on the board of directors. The main objective of these policies 
was to combat gender inequality, which largely dominates board composition. Since 
then, the question on the implications of board gender diversity on a company’s 
outputs has aroused much interest among researchers and academics. However, 
although several studies have found that women, compared to men, are psychologi-
cally more risk averse [1–3], it is not clear that the presence of women on boards of 
directors leads to better performance even less and reduces overall firm risk.
Indeed, many empirical studies have attempted to study the impact of gender 
diversity on firm financial performance in general and on firm global risk in 
particular [4–8], the results did not allow ruling on a stable relationship between 
gender diversity on board of directors and firm risk. Indeed, while some research 
does not show any effect, asserting that women directors do not necessarily mitigate 
firm risk [7, 9] but their presence can increase the supervisory function of the board 
of directors, some other research has shown that the proportion of board mem-
bers female is associated with an increased risk [10–12]. In contrast, other studies 
essentially mobilizing the resource dependency theory [13], feminist theory [14], 
and social identity theory [15] have shown a negative impact of the female gender 
on risk taking and firm financial stability. For instance, a low variability in stock 
market returns has been observed in companies with mixed membership on boards 
of directors [16]. Similarly, Hutchinson et al. [17] have shown that the feminiza-
tion of the board of directors moderates the excessive risk-taking of the company. 
Finally, other research has established that the proportion of women on boards 
needs to reach a “critical mass” to have an impact on the risk [18].
The present study aims to contribute to the literature dealing with gender diver-
sity on firm global performance by examining, in particular, the impact of gender 
diversity on firm risk in two ways. First, on a theoretical level, it seeks to strengthen 
the hypothesis of a negative link between diversity in the composition of boards of 
directors and corporate risk. Second, on an empirical level, this study, conducted in 
the French context, seeks to enrich the debate on the consequences of gender diver-
sity on firm global performance, especially since the conclusions drawn by previ-
ous research remain mixed. The choice of the French case and the analysis period 
(2011–2018) are certainly not arbitrary. Indeed, it coincides with the adoption of the 
Copé-Zimmermann law (2011), which imposes quotas for women on boards of direc-
tors and supervisory boards. Besides, according to the Global Gender Balance Report 
(2021), France took the top spot with 44% of board positions held by women.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2 discusses the 
theoretical foundations of the impact of board gender diversity on the firm risk 
and justify the hypothesis of a negative impact. Section 3 presents the proposed 
methodology of empirical validation. Finally, Section 4 discusses the results and 
conclusions as well as the managerial implications of this research.
2. Literature review and hypothesis development
The link between board gender diversity and firm risk may be apprehended 
from many theoretical lenses.
Agency theory highlights the divergence of interests between managers and 
shareholders. It argues that managers, because of their opportunism, can be driven 
2 Copé-Zimmermann law (2011) which imposes quotas for women on boards of directors and supervi-
sory boards.
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into practices of self-interest’s maximizing to the detriment of those of sharehold-
ers [19]. This situation is often facilitated by weak internal control exercised by 
homogeneous boards of directors. Thus, due to overconfidence and weak control, 
male managers, are likely to be engaged in risky investments, discretionary spend-
ing, and excessive indebtedness. Moreover, several studies have shown that women’s 
presence on boards of directors reinforces the monitoring mechanisms, makes it 
possible to resolve agency conflicts, and moderates risky decision-making. For 
example, Mirza et al. [20] have shown that, by playing their supervisory role in the 
board, women improve resource allocation and limit the problem of overinvest-
ment problems. Jizi and Nehme [21] noted that female presence on boards makes it 
possible to mitigate firm risk by reducing stock return volatility. In recent research, 
Zhou [22] was able to demonstrate on a sample of 2825 Chinese companies and 
21,420 firm-yearly observations that women managers will reduce firm risk distress 
by a quarter by going through better cash management. The author also emphasizes 
that the presence of women directors enjoys better access to bank loans with greater 
frequency to reduce insolvency risk.
According to gender socialization theory [23], women have distinct traits, values, 
and interests because of the personalities they develop during childhood. Women 
show more altruism and compassion and care more about others. Female managers 
are also more attached to ethical codes [24] and less tempted by corruption [25].
Regarding risk preferences, women would be more hostile to risk than men, 
especially in financial decisions. This could be explained by the fact that men are 
overconfident and rely on their personal experiences and their own risk assess-
ments, leading them to make riskier decisions than women who are less self-confi-
dent and tend to dodge risky decisions [26].
Upper echelon theory [27] suggests that strategic choices are determined and 
influenced by the values and cognitive bases of the dominant actors in the organiza-
tion. Thus, preferences and decisions are likely to be predicted by managerial back-
ground characteristics. According to [28], decisions made by directors are impacted 
by their psychological traits. Women on boards, known for their sensitivity to risk, 
would favor less risky policies. Under this perspective, Jeong and Harrison [29] 
argue that differences in business performance can be explained by the reduction 
in strategic risk-taking adopted by women. Li and Zeng [30] were able to highlight 
the importance of the female gender in the financial decision-making process and 
the stock return crash risk prevention. Likewise, Perryman et al. [31] found that 
companies with greater gender diversity in top management teams have lower 
market risk and offer better performance.
According to the social identity theory [15] a person’s idea of their own identity 
is based on their membership in a group. Any behavior will change depending 
on the identity of the group to which a person belongs. The presence of women 
on boards of directors, who are less willing to take risks, may have an impact on 
decision-making processes.
Human capital theory [32] postulates that board diversity may produce benefits 
in terms of efficiency and control. Board members with heterogeneous skills, 
preferences, and backgrounds constitute a valuable, unique, inimitable, and hardly 
transferable resource. Human capital theory joins resource dependence theory [33] 
suggesting that directors bring benefits to the organization (information, networks, 
preferential resources, and legitimacy). According to Ferreira [34], gender diverse 
board has access to a larger pool of resources. It is, therefore, expected that board 
women presence would influence firm financial performance and firm risk levels. 
Mobilizing these theoretical approaches, Farag and Mallin [35] concluded that the 
vulnerability of banks to crises is likely to be reduced by a critical mass of female 
representation. De Cabo et al. [36] observed that low-risk European banks have 
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a higher proportion of women on boards of directors. Saeed et al. [37] found that 
board gender diversity is inversely related to business risk in emerging and devel-
oped countries. In contrast, Talavera et al. [38] could not find a significant associa-
tion between found no significant association between women directors and firm 
risk. Yang et al. [39] found a negative effect of mandated female representation on 
firm performance and firm risk.
Based on the above theoretical and empirical literature, we assume the existence 
of significant negative impact women presence on board on the corporate Global 
risk. Hence, we formulate our main hypothesis as follows:
H: gender diversity on the board of directors has a negative effect on firm 
global risk.
3. Research methodology
3.1 Sample and data
For the purposes of this study, we used a sample of French companies belonging 
to the SBF 120 index over the period 2011–2018. The SBF 120 index includes the 120 
most important companies in terms of market capitalization and trading volumes 
on the Euronext Paris market. This 10-year period analysis allowed us to constitute 
a large panel of observations enriching the results and the validity of the economet-
ric tests. Financial institutions were excluded from the sample due to differences 
in their specific governance and accounting systems. The final panel consisted 
of 64 companies. Thus, the study covers 576 firm-year observations. Data about 
women’s presence on board were hand-collected from the reference documents and 
annual reports available on the firms’ websites. Financial and accounting data were 
obtained from the ThomsonOne database.
Table 1 presents the firm distribution by industry within the sample.
3.2 Variables description
In financial theory, two components are used to measure the risk of the com-
pany. On the one hand, market risk generally resulting from factors exogenous to 
the company such as fluctuations in supply and demand, interest rates, and input 
Sector Number %
1. Oil and gas 5 7.8
2. Basic materials 3 4.6
3. Industrial 16 25
4. consumer goods 12 18.8
5. Health 7 10.9
6. Consumer services 12 18.8
7. Telecommunications 1 1.5
8. Utilities 3 4.7
9. Technology 5 7.8
Total 64 100
Table 1. 
Distribution of companies by industry.
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costs. On the other hand, the idiosyncratic risk is inherent in the company’s opera-
tions and its management expertise. The overall risk of an investment is commonly 
measured by the standard deviation of its return [40–42]. In accordance with previ-
ous research [43–45], we use the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 


















itRs  = standard deviation of company’s monthly stock return,  
itR  = company’s monthly stock return, R  = company’s average monthly stock 
return, n  = Number of observation.
Thus, a higher standard deviation value reflects a higher risk.
The gender variable (GEND) was measured by the percentage of women on the 
board of directors (number of women on the board of directors/total number of 
directors). This measure, more and more used by similar researchers [5, 46, 47], 
makes it possible to go beyond the limits of binary measurements of women’s pres-
ence and their representativeness in the boards and to take into account board size.
In addition, we have deemed it useful to introduce control variables that are 
likely to have an effect on the relationship between women’s presence on boards of 
directors and firm risk.
First, the size of the board of directors (B-SIZE) was included as a control vari-
able as a large board has more chance to contain female members. In addition, pre-
vious literature suggests that the size of boards of directors is a major determinant 
of its effectiveness and governance mechanism to protect company assets, to secure 
better allocation of resources, to limit managerial opportunism, and to prevent the 
risks of insolvency risk or dangers of risky investments. B-SIZE is measured by the 
number of directors on the board. Larger boards tend to be also associated with 
lower return volatility [48].
Second, R&D spending and innovation effort are considered as an indicator 
of risk-taking insofar as their impact often remains uncertain [7]. R&D intensity 
(RID), measured by the “R&D expenditures divided by total annual sales” ratio, was 
introduced into the model as a control variable. Third, we control the model by the 
Variable Abbreviation Measurement
Firm global risk RISK Standard deviation of monthly stock return
Gender diversity GEND Percentage of women on board of directors
Board size B-SIZ Number of directors on the board.
Firm financial performance FFP Return On Assets ratio
Firm size F-SIZ Natural logarithm of total assets (in millions of Euros)
Leverage LEV Total debt to total assets ratio
R&D expenditure intensity RDI R&D expenditures divided by total annual sales
Gender diversity GEND Percentage of women on board of directors
Board size B-SIZ Number of directors on the board
Table 2. 
Variables description.
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leverage (LEV). Leverage is considered to be an indicator of solvency often associated 
directly with firm financial risk. According to Bodie et al. [49], leverage level allows 
welling assess the risk of financial distress and bankruptcy and provides information 
on the ability of the company to honor its financial commitments. Among others, 
Abobakr and Elgiziry [50] found that percentage of females to the total board to be 
significantly negatively correlated to ratio leverage. We define leverage as the “total 
debt to total assets” ratio. Forth, firm size (F-SIZ), measured by the natural logarithm 
of total assets (in millions of Euros), was introduced into our model as a control 
variable. In this regard, Bruna et al. [9], for example, have shown that risk aversion 
was negatively associated with firm size. Finally, since profitability level could imply 
greater risk-taking [51], we opted for controlling for profitability (FFP) calculated as 
the Return on Assets. For a detailed description of variables see Table 2.
3.3 Model
To test our hypotheses, we use panel data regression running the follow-
ing model.
 ( ), , , , , t t t t t tit i i i i i iRISK f GEND B SIZ FFP F SIZ LEV RID= - -  (2)
Model 1
 
0 1 2 3 4
5 5
 it it it it it
it it i it
RISK GEND B SIZ FFP F SIZ
LEV RID e
b b b b b
b b m
= + + - + + -
+ + +  (3)
In equation 3, the index t presents the year of the observation, while the index 
i refers to the company. The variable RISK is our dependent variable. GEND is the 
proportion of women on the board of directors. B-SIZ, FFP, F-SIZ, LEV, and RID 
are our controls as defined above. The βj with j {0…6} are the model parameters. μ is 
the time fixed effect and e is our idiosyncratic error term.
4. Results and discussion
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for all variables. The data show that the 
average 10-year stock return volatility is 34.6%, with a minimum and a maximum 
of 1.3 and 90%, respectively. Nevertheless, RISK presents a significant dispersion 
with a high standard deviation, which is understandable given the diversity of the 
firms being studied. Regarding gender diversity, the proportion of women is 23.8% 
of the total number of directors. It should be noted that this average has increased 
considerably over time after the Copé-Zimmermann enacted the law in 2011. The 
average size of boards of directors is around 14, and the average return on assets of 
the companies in our sample is around 4%.
4.2 Multivariate analyzes
The correlations between all test variables are reported in Table 4. At this point, 
and without claiming to draw a definitive conclusion, we notice that GEND has a 
high negative correlation with the risk metric. This is consistent with our hypothesis 
7
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and is in line with the result of the current literature. GEND also has a strong corre-
lation (p-value <0.0001) with both board size (0.1654) and financial performance 
(0.2211). This is reasonable as large boards are more likely to include the female 
gender. There is a significant correlation between risk and board size in our sample, 
which is consistent with previous researches [52]. Besides, we note a positive 
correlation at the 1% level of confidence between risk and ROA and a significantly 
positive association between risk and leverage ratio. Finally, there is a significant 
relationship between risk and R&D expenditures.
To test our hypothesis, we ran least squares regressions and then we had selected 
the appropriate estimation based on the different usage tests. Our estimation satis-
fies the assumptions of normality. Furthermore, we had ensured the independence 
between the error terms by the Durbin-Watson autocorrelation test and the absence 
of heteroscedasticity problems by the Breusch-Pagan test. Finally, the F-test allowed 
us to opt for the fixed-effect estimation, which allows overcoming unobserved 
heterogeneity issue over time.
According to Table 5 results, the model’s explanatory power is acceptable (R2 
within equal to 24.12%). The statistic of the Wald test (Wald Chi), presents a statis-
tically significant p-value (Prob > Chi) at 1% level. The coefficient of the dependant 
variable (gender) is negative and significant (Coeff. = −0.903; t-stat = − 2.82) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. deviation Max Min
RISK 576 0.346 0.205 1.441 0.013
GEND 576 0.238 0.1152 0.609 0
B-SIZ 576 13.93 3.696 25 5
FFP 576 0.039 0.049 0.7751 −0.3374
F-SIZ 576 9379 1438 12,284 6463
LEV 576 0.372 0.2081 0.886 0.082
RDI 576 0.0451 0.1055 0.1815 0.001
Table 3. 
Descriptive statistics.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 VIF
1. RISK 1
2. GEND −0.1315*** 1 1.19
3. B-SIZ −0.0542** 0.1654*** 1 1.05
4. FFP 0.1101** 0.2211*** 0.059 1 1.90
5. F-SIZ −0.1151* 0.2650 0.4520*** 0.0568 1 1.20
6. LEV 0.0412* −0.0115 0.0684 0.2315*** −0.0050 1 1.05
7. RDI 0.0954** 0.1154** −0.0019 0.1345** −0.0642 −0.0290 1 1.85
Mean VIF 1.37
This table presents the correlations between all variables and the variance inflation factor (VIF). It shows that 
correlation between the explanatory variables as each of the variables used range from 1.05 to 1.90 along with mean 
VIF value below 10.*Significance at the 5% levels.
**Significance at the 1% levels.
***Significance at the 0.01% levels.
Table 4. 
Correlation matrix.
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indicating that women board presence mitigates firm risk. This result supports 
our assumption; that is, to say that an increase in women representation on board 
decreases firm risk. It is also in line with the main arguments presented in our 
theoretical background. Women are less “adventurous” than men and are likely to 
have an innate aversion to risk. Then, this result joins those obtained in previous 
empirical research [5, 53]. However, these findings do not support those found by 
[9] who have found no evidence to support the assumption of a significant rela-
tionship between women on corporate boards and firm risk-taking on a sample of 
SBF 120 index listed companies. This can be explained by the fact that the authors 
carried out their investigation over the period 2006–2010 before the adoption of the 
Copé-Zimmermann law in 2011 or by the measurement of the risk retained.
Other than the GEND effect, we find a negative association between board size 
and firm global risk (under the 5% risk error). This is in line with the risk aversion 
hypothesis, which suggests that large boards tend to control leverage, as this will 
increase the volatility of equity returns [54]. Likewise, this can be explained by 
the fact that large boards can lead to slower decision-making processes and search 
for compromises inducing less risky behaviors. This result is in accordance with 
Nakano and Nguyen [52] who observed lower performance volatility and lower 
risk bankruptcy in companies with larger boards of directors. Another explanation 
could be found in the arguments put forward by Cheng [53] and Wang [54] sug-
gesting that a high number of administrators would prevent boards from function-
ing properly, thus limiting performance variability. Bureaucracy and vulnerability 
to agency issues that characterize large boards may cause less performance volatility 
and higher risk.
The positive coefficient of the variable FFP confirms that risk has a positive 
effect on return on assets. However, this influence is not statistically significant. The 
proportion of women on the board of directors, therefore, has no impact on eco-














This table presents results from fixed effects regression of the risk measure on board gender diversity, over the period 
2011–2018. A firm’s total risk (RISK) is the annualized standard deviation from the monthly stock returns over the 
past year. GEND is the percentage of women on the board of directors.
*Significance at the 10% level.
**Significance at the 5% level.
***Significance at the 1% level.
Table 5. 
Multifactor regression results RISK as a dependant variable.
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presented by Akbas et al. [55] according to which a greater risk is not associated 
with better expected profitability, nor with the results of Nartea et al. [56] who 
determined that risk has a positive effect on return.
In addition, we found a negative link between firm size and risk. This may be 
because large companies, which enjoy better governance and less information 
asymmetry, tend to control the volatility of stock returns [57]. This negative rela-
tionship was also found by Damanpour [58] who argues that large companies better 
control fluctuations in stock prices.
Also, Table 5 indicates a coefficient on leverage variable of 0.091, significant 
at 5% level of confidence (t-statistics of 2.46). These results confirm the close link 
between stock return volatility the leverage suggesting that the volatility of returns 
represents a risk hindering the company’ ability to go for debt financing [59].
Finally, R&D intensity has a coefficient of 0.0009 (t-statistic 5.49) significant 
at 1% level. This relationship most likely exists. One of the plausible explanations 
has been given by Mazzucato and Tancioni [60] suggesting that the volatility of 
stock returns is indeed linked to innovation since financial markets react to signals 
provided by companies about their future growth prospects through their R&D 
spending and innovation behavior.
5. Conclusion
The aim of this research was to examine the impact of gender diversity on firm 
risk. More specifically, we studied the relationship between board women pres-
ence and firm global risk measured by stock return volatility. To this end, we used 
a sample of French companies listed SBF 120 over the period 2011–2018. Using a 
panel data regression method, we were able to highlight a negative and statistically 
significant link between the percentage of women on boards of directors and firm 
risk. Our results suggest that better women representativeness on boards could lead 
to better financial performance through risk mitigation. This is in line with gender 
socialization theory suggesting that women would be more risk-averse as well as 
with the agency theory, which states that women would exercise better control 
and participate actively in conflict resolution. The potential explanations for this 
negative effect would lie not only in the crucial role played by women in boards 
in ensuring better risk oversight [7, 13], in the reduction of agency costs [61], but 
also in the risk aversion generally observed among women [62]. Our results help to 
enrich the debate on this issue. They are consistent with a current of the literature 
[26, 31, 63] but remain in contradiction with the results of other empirical research 
([9]). Thus, this should lead us to consider the role of contingent variables that may 
moderate/mediate this relationship, such as cultural differences, organizational 
visibility, or intersectorial differences. On the other hand, we should also recognize 
that reverse causation is likely to exist and deserves to be examined, which means 
that companies with lower risk might intentionally choose more female directors 
[36]. Thus, it is important to address the issue of endogeneity when studying the 
relationship between gender diversity on the board of directors and business risk.
Moreover, although our results suggest that women inclusion on boards is likely 
to strengthen corporate governance mechanisms, mitigate risks, and maximize 
value, it is important to note that such appointments should not be a reaction to 
normative pressures just to legitimize governance modes or to comply with rules 
deemed socially acceptable. Our results should therefore not be analyzed from 
an instrumentalist perspective, that is to say, from purely economic and financial 
angles, but rather based on notions of gender equity and justice as well as on fun-
damental legal principles. Hence, it is also strongly recommended that nomination 
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and governance committees in the boards of directors take steps to achieve men-
women parity within boards. The laws of the various European countries appear to 
be evolving in this direction.
Our study has also several limitations. First, by focusing our investigation only 
on large companies, the results cannot be generalized. The extension of the sample 
to cover small- and medium-sized enterprises would make it possible to give more 
robustness to observed results. The second limit is related to the risk measurement: 
the variability of stock return may not capture all risks incurred by the company. 
Finally, an impact of the female presence may not be immediate: Considering a 
delay effect (by introducing lagged variables in the econometric model) would 
probably be interesting since the appointment of women may take time to observe 
its risk impact.
© 2021 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited. 
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